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1. Compared to most city-states in late medieval and Renaissance Italy, Venice
largely escaped the rivalries and factional conflicts that plagued civic life1.
Venice’s relative success in dousing the flames of factional conflict was the result
of many factors, but the principal source of Venice’s political achievement lay
in a series of laws passed between 1297 and 1323 which have collectively come
to be known as the Serrata (Closing) of the Great Council. By identifying the
constituent members of the ruling élite and guaranteeing them and their
descendants perpetual inclusion in the Great Council, the Serrata effectively
stifled the impulse toward factionalism by enlarging the ruling class and making
political enfranchisement a hereditary right. It safeguarded members from exile,
the most commonly used weapon in factional conflict. Rather than becoming a
tool of factionalism, kinship became a protection against it2. Over the course of
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the identification of patrician family and
state interests continued to develop, especially as the state became the guarantor
of the legitimacy of patrician births and marriages3. 
Rituals such as the registration of noble births and marriages with the
avogadori di comun (state attorneys) and enrollment in the lottery for early
entry into the Great Council held on Saint Barbara’s day reinforced kinship
identity4. The requirement that members of patrilineages exit the Great Council
Hall whenever one of their members was up for election also strengthened the
sense that they shared a common fate5. Since the key to political success
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* I am especially grateful to Stanley Chojnacki for many helpful comments and suggestions on an
earlier version of this essay which was presented to the Seminar on Late Medieval and Early
Modern Italy at the Institute for Historical Research, London. I wish to thank Trevor Dean and
Kate Lowe for the invitation to present it there.
1 For testimony by Rolandino of Padua, Petrarch, and San Bernardino to Venice’s tranquility, see
Bouwsma, 65; Petrarca, 234; Origo, 155.
2 For the Serrata, see Lane, 1971; Merores; Roesch; Chojnacki, 1974; Ruggiero, 1979; and
O’Connell.
3 Chojnacki, 1994; Chojnacki, 2000a.
4 Chojnacki, 2000b, 53-75, 206-43.
5 Finlay, 86-87.
depended on the ability to garner votes in elections, patricians had to build
coalitions; and the most effective way to do this was through marriage.
Consequently, the selection of marriage partners became a high stakes game
involving a complicated calculation of social prestige, economic resources, and
political influence. The net effect of all these alliances was to bind the nobles
together in great interlocking webs of family relations, and the constant
scurrying about for votes and pursuit of favors contributed to a sense of class
cohesion and loyalty to the state6. 
The consensus first formulated in the Serrata was further solidified during
the War of Chioggia (1379-81). In the darkest days of this conflict, when the
Genoese fleet entered the protected waters of the lagoon, the Venetians pulled
together and defeated the enemy. In recognition of their contributions to the
war effort, thirty non-noble families were granted entry into the Great Council7.
But this was the last large-scale admission of new blood into the patriciate
until the seventeenth century. In fact, in 1403 the Pien Collegio (the Ducal
Council and the Senate’s steering committee) rejected a proposal that would
have guaranteed a constant replenishment of new members (and wealth) into
the patriciate when it defeated a measure that would have granted a popolano
(non-noble) family membership in the Great Council every time a noble family
became extinct. Rejection of this plan transformed the patriciate, as Frederic
Lane observed, into a “closed caste”8.
The following year Venice made a foreign policy decision that fundamentally
altered the nature of the Venetian state and whose repercussions would be felt
until the end of the Republic. In 1404, Venice undertook the conquest of
neighboring territories on the Italian mainland, reversing a policy of economic
exploitation but political detachment that had lasted for centuries. Over the
next two years it seized Padua, Vicenza, and Verona and their surrounding
countryside. Between 1425 and 1427 the Venetians expanded their territory
further when they dissolved their long-standing alliance with Milan and wrested
control of Brescia and Bergamo and their neighboring lands. To the east in these
same years, they solidified their control over Friuli. In a little more than two
decades then, the Venetians had transformed their republic from a relatively
isolated city-state with far-flung colonies in the eastern Mediterranean into a
territorial state with a serious stake in all aspects of Italian peninsular affairs9.
The consequences of this transformation were enormous. For the next
thirty years, Venice found itself engaged in nearly constant warfare. Since the
Venetians relied on mercenary troops, they were forced to raise vast sums of
money, leading in 1454 to the collapse of the Monte or state-funded debt10.
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6 Finlay, 81-96; Romano, 1987, 120-31; Zannini, 1996, 420.
7 On the War of Chioggia, see Lane, 1973, 189-96.
8 Lane, 1971, 241-42; Davis, 18-19.
9 There is a large literature on the conquest of the Terraferma and its consequences. For a general
introduction, see Lane, 1973, 225-34; Mallett, 181-244; Cozzi and Knapton, 3-47. 
10 Mueller, 453-87.
The mercenary captains who led the troops also posed problems since several
of them had territorial ambitions of their own11. Administration of the newly
conquered Terraferma lands created other difficulties, not the least of which
was a scramble for jobs by poorer patricians. Finally, the recently conquered
lands added new social strains since members of the patriciate could now
expand their networks of friends and clients well beyond the previously limited
confines of the Great Council to include foreign princes and the élites of the
conquered territories12. Against this backdrop the consensus of the fourteenth
century started to break down, and for the first time the possibility that the
patriciate would descend into factionalism and pursue vendetta became real.
2. The obligation to seek revenge was a widely held conviction in Renaissance
Italy, one deeply embedded in codes of honor13. Consequently we might expect
it to have been a special concern of members of the Venetian nobility. But, as
Guido Ruggiero observes, following the settlement reached in the Serrata,
“violence within the nobility lost most of its function [emphasis mine];” it was
not a favored weapon in the patricians’ “struggle for position”14. Instead,
Venetian nobles fought their battles in the council halls by means of the ballot
box, using their alliances to garner enough votes to reward their friends and
punish their enemies. But in the middle years of the fifteenth century, these
struggles took a turn as fear of a new form of reprisal, what can be termed
judicial vendetta, became a concern.
An early example of this phenomenon dates from 1433 when a group of
young nobles banded together illegally to vote for one another in elections for
lesser administrative posts. The plot threatened the fairness of elections, the
very foundation of Venice’s consensual patrician regime. As Donald Queller
noted, “fear of factions” stood behind all Venetian attempts to end electoral
corruption. The thirty-eight noblemen involved in the plot got various
punishments including banishment and deprivation of offices15. The Ten also
ruled that those who had investigated and tried the conspirators could protect
themselves against possible retaliation by carrying arms. This included not
only the regular members of the Ten but also the supernumerary members
(the zonta or addition) added to give the council’s decisions in the case added
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11 Mallett and Hale, 1-210.
12 Zannini, 459-63; Cozzi and Knapton, 205-30; and Viggiano, 529-75.
13 Much of the anthropological literature on which historians have drawn argues that vendetta,
which was closely associated with the protection of honor, served to reinforce the identity of the
group pursuing the vendetta. See, for example, Black-Michaud. As far as anthropologists’ debate
over the distinction between vendetta and feud is concerned, I concur with Thomas Kuehn and
Edward Muir that the distinction has little heuristic value for historical studies. See Kuehn, 1991,
320, n. 23; Muir, xxiii-xxiv. For a contrasting view, see Dean, 15-16.
14 Ruggiero, 1980, 150-51.
15 For a convenient summary of the plots, see Queller, 79-89. See also Romano, 2007, 109-12.
weight and authority. But then the Ten went further by ruling that at no time
in the future could any of the participants in the plot serve as judges or
witnesses in cases involving members of the Ten, the zonta, or their sons. The
government through the Ten was acknowledging that its own institutions
might be used by some of its members to seek vengeance against others and
subvert justice. Moreover, it recognized that like other forms of vendetta, this
one might extend across generations, to the sons of those who had prosecuted
and heard the case16.
No modern legal term precisely captures the principles involved here,
although several approximate it17. One is disqualification. In this sense, the 1433
conspirators were disqualified from ever serving as judges of their own
prosecutors since it was assumed that they would not be impartial. Recuse is
another; in essence the Ten recused or challenged the competency of the
conspirators as prejudiced. Conflict of interest also comes to mind; the
conspirators were disqualified since they had a clear conflict of interest in any
future cases. As far back as the thirteenth century, the Venetian government
had demonstrated concern over these issues, most obviously in the requirement
that relations exit the Great Council whenever a kinsman was up for election18.
But now the Ten perceived a more acute threat, namely that the conspirators
would actively and willfully use the law and future judicial proceedings to seek
revenge against those who had prosecuted them, that the governmental
apparatus itself would become the means of waging vendetta.
Fortunately for the stability of the Venetian state, the conspirators of 1433
were a loosely knit group of minor nobles who had little in common except their
youth and political insignificance. Furthermore their disqualification – to adopt
the term which comes closest to what transpired – ended with them. It did not
extend to other family members. But what would happen if this principle were
linked more explicitly to kinship and applied to more important figures, ones
with real power and extensive family connections? If this occurred, it could easily
foster party or factional loyalties. This is precisely what happened beginning in
1445 when the son of doge Francesco Foscari (1373-1457) was placed on trial. 
3. Francesco Foscari was elected doge in 1423. It was under his leadership and
guidance that Venice made its territorial expansion into Lombardy. Foscari’s
chief competitor in the election was Pietro Loredan, a distinguished naval
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16 Archivio di Stato, Venezia (hereafter ASVe), Consiglio dei Dieci, Deliberazioni Misti (hereafter
DM), reg. 11, fol. 68r (28 January 1432 m.v.). The law noted that similar protections had been
provided in the past. However, with the crises of the fifteenth century, the desire for protection took
on new urgency.
17 I wish to thank Wendy Scott of the Syracuse University Law Library for help in thinking about
the appropriate legal terminology.
18 For some examples from the thirteenth-century deliberations of the Great Council, see Cessi,
2:26 (act xxix), 27, (act xxxi), 41 (lxxxvii), 49 (xxiiii), 84 (xxiiii), 251 (v).
commander and war hero. It has long (and erroneously) been held that the
election of Foscari represented the victory of a group of hawks who were intent
on mainland conquest over a group of doves who wished to continue Venice’s
traditional policy of overseas trade and disengagement from Terraferma
affairs, and that this conflict mirrored the contrasting economic interests of
the two sides, with Foscari and his allies heavily invested in the mainland and
his opponents committed to maritime trading ventures19. What is true is that
Foscari and Pietro Loredan were rivals, but the source of the rivalry appears
to have been largely personal and had to do with their differing backgrounds
and interests. Loredan presented himself as a swashbuckling naval commander
and cultivated his family’s tradition of maritime service. Foscari, by contrast,
was an expert in Terraferma affairs and the administration of charitable trusts;
he adopted the image of a pious administrator20.
The Doge’s fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse when in 1445 his
only surviving son Jacopo was accused of accepting bribes from foreign
princes. Several months earlier, the rivalry between the Foscari and Loredan
had been rekindled when Francesco Loredan a nephew of Pietro (who had died
in 1438) and Matteo Vitturi, a Foscari ally, had engaged in dueling prosecutions
of one another21. A compromise was eventually worked out, but not before
Vitturi admitted that he had pursued the case against Loredan out of a desire
for vendetta22. 
Francesco Loredan was again one of the heads of the Ten when in February
1445 it began to investigate Jacopo Foscari. As in the 1433 election plot, the
members of the Ten added a zonta to their proceedings. On 18 February they
ordered Jacopo’s arrest and interrogation, even authorizing the use of torture.
In spite of assurances from the Doge, members of the Ten feared retribution
for their action. Accordingly, they approved a measure put forward by Loredan
and his colleague Giovanni Memo (but not by the third head, Ermolao Donato)
prohibiting Foscari as well as his and Jacopo’s relatives, whom they defined as
those who had to excuse themselves from voting in the Great Council when a
kinsmen was up for election, from ever sitting in judgment in any case
involving any of the members of the Ten and the zonta or their sons. The actual
wording was more fulsome; Foscari and his relatives were neither, “to support
nor oppose, nor testify, nor denounce, nor speechify, nor talk, nor dispute, nor
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19 For a full discussion of this supposed division, see Romano, 2007, 28-34.
20 For the Loredan’s maritime activities, see Stockly, 305-08; for the contrast between Loredan and
Foscari, see Romano, 2007, 26-27. Increasingly, historians are viewing the polarity
amicus/inimicus and hatred as central to politics. See Zorzi, 139; Crouzet-Pavan, 121-62. See also
Miglio.
21 Vitturi’s father Bulgaro was one of the leading proponents of Foscari’s election as doge. See
Romano, 1998, 47-48. For the prosecution of Vitturi, see ASVe, DM, reg. 12, fols. 164r, 186r (acts
dated 29 September 1444). 
22 ASVe, DM, reg. 12, fol. 185v (5 October 1444). For the compromise solution, see ASVe, DM, reg.
12, fol. 164v (7 October 1444). 
make a motion, nor exhort, nor vote, nor in any way impede anything
pertaining to or regarding those who were in this council or their sons”. The
Ten approved this measure, as they noted, so that they could speak their
consciences, “for the honor and good of the state of the Venetians” and so that
they “might not fear at any time vendetta (vindictam) from anyone for
administering justice”. The Ten’s secretaries then recorded the names of all
thirty men protected by this decision, including their own23. 
In passing this measure, the Ten delineated what had heretofore been
merely a vaguely defined group. It identified the core of the Foscari party –
namely the Foscari kinsmen – defined as those who had to exit the Great
Council whenever one of them was up for election. Judicial vendetta was
now linked explicitly to kinship. What the Ten also did (and what the
secretaries did quite literally) was create a list of those who, as a consequence
of Jacopo’s prosecution, were now seen in some way at least, as an
oppositional group to the Foscari – a group that was vulnerable to use of the
law to wage vendetta. It is unlikely that many members of this group, with
the exception of Loredan, felt any particular animosity toward the doge; but
by their own action, they had now set themselves up as his potential
opponents. Furthermore, the extension of the legal protection to their sons
guaranteed that these groupings would continue into the next generation.
The seeds of factional identification had been sown; it remained to be seen
whether or not they would take root24.
In fact, they lay dormant for some time. Jacopo defied the Ten’s order that
he go into exile to Nauplion in Greece. His banishment eventually was changed
to nearby Treviso, and in 1447 his father got it rescinded altogether25. Then in
November 1450 the city was shaken again when Ermolao Donato, who had
been one of the heads of the Ten during Jacopo’s first trial, was murdered
while returning home from the Ducal Palace. Donato was married to the late
Pietro Loredan’s daughter Marina. The Ten’s investigation led nowhere until
a witness came forward accusing Jacopo and his servants of the murder. The
Ten arrested and tortured Jacopo but were unable to extract a confession from
him. Eventually, it convicted and sentenced him to permanent exile on Crete.
It seems likely that the sentence, which was relatively lenient given the gravity
of the crime, represented a compromise solution to a thorny problem which
threatened the regime’s unity at a critical time in foreign relations26.
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23 The original phrases read, “nec favere, nec disfavere, nec testificari, nec denunciare, nec
arrengare, nec loqui, nec disputare, nec ponere partem, nec hortari, nec ponere ballotam, nec
denique in aliqua re ad ipsos qui fuerint in isto consilio aut filios suos spectante vel pertinente se
aliqualiter impedire”, and “pro honore et bono statu Venetiarum, et non timeat ullo tempore pro
administrata iusticia vindictam ab aliquo”. ASVe, DM, reg. 12, fols. 173r-v (19 February 1444 m.v.);
printed in Berlan, 70-71.
24 Romano, 2007, 192-93.
25 Romano, 2007, 194-201, 207-09. For the relevant documents, see Berlan, 72-90.
26 Romano, 2007, 216-24. The records of Jacopo’s second trial are found in Berlan, 92-115.
As in the preceding case, the Ten and zonta awarded themselves protection
against legal retaliation by the Foscari and their relatives. But they went further
for they now extended the protection to an even larger circle of their own
kinsmen. Whereas before it encompassed only the members of the Ten and
zonta and their sons, it now included their brothers and grandsons as well.
Once again, the scribes dutifully listed the names of the thirty-five men covered
by the provision27. Like the ripples created by a stone tossed into a pond, so the
Ten’s protection was being extended to ever-widening circles of kinsmen as
more and more members of the patriciate got caught up in the vortex of
possible vendetta and factionalism. Kinship, which following the Serrata had
become essential to political enfranchisement, was rapidly becoming the
criterion by which some members of the patriciate were excluded from
exercising certain of their political rights. 
4. Matters came to a head a few years later beginning with yet another trial of
Jacopo Foscari, who was once again accused of contact with foreign powers.
Among those leading the investigation was Jacopo Loredan son of the late
Pietro, now serving as one of the heads of the Ten. And yet again, the members
of the council voted themselves, their sons, grandsons, and brothers, protection
against “vendetta” on the part of the Foscari and their relations28. Jacopo was
retrieved from Crete and examined. Following their investigation, the members
of the Ten were deeply divided over how to deal with him. The most lenient
proposal called for him to resume his exile; the harshest, proposed by Jacopo
Loredan, recommended that he be beheaded between the twin columns in the
Piazzetta. In the end, the Ten voted that Jacopo should return to Crete, spend
a year in jail, and then resume the previous terms of his exile29. But now the
concerns about vendetta, reified by the Ten’s laws offering protection to
themselves and the members of the zonta, had become entangled in the rivalry
between the Foscari and the Loredan. Members of the patriciate whether they
wished to or not were enveloped in a conflict in which many had no inherent
interest, but which threatened the unity of the regime. 
Following his condemnation, Jacopo was returned to Crete. Then in early
1457 news reached Venice that he had died. The impact of Jacopo’s death
coupled with the Doge’s advanced age was profound; by all accounts, Foscari
ceased to perform his duties. Even one of his partisans conceded that Foscari
engaged himself little “in the governance of the Republic”30. 
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27 ASVe, DM, reg. 14, fol. 29v (28 January 1450mv); and Berlan, 102-03.
28 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 96v (8 June 1456); Berlan, 117-19.
29 For a full account of this trial, see Romano, 2007, 277-85. The documents are printed in Berlan,
116-31.
30 It reads, “pocho al governo di questa republica”. Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (hereafter BNM),
Ms. It. Cl. VII, 794 (8503), Cronaca di Giorgio Dolfin (hereafter Dolfin), fol. 448r. 
In the midst of all this, the discovery of two new cases of electoral fraud
further rocked the city. The first involved nobleman Donato Corner who tried
to rig an election for the post of podestà (governor) of Ravenna so that his
father would win. The other case involved, like the 1433 one, a complicated
scheme by a group of nobles whose ringleader was Bartolomeo Pisani. His plan
was to make others beholden to him by engineering their election to various
posts. In response to the two cases, the Ten meted out various punishments;
they also passed measures designed to ensure the integrity of future elections.
And as in the 1433 election case and the various trials of Jacopo Foscari, the
Ten again put in place rules designed to protect themselves, their sons,
grandsons, and brothers from judicial retaliation by the relatives of the
ringleaders. This time, however, rather than simply stating that the prohibition
included those who normally had to exit the Great Council whenever a relative
was up for election, the Ten specified whom they meant to disqualify. The
prohibition encompassed the “fathers, brothers, and sons, sons-in-law, and
brothers-in-law of all of the aforesaid condemned (men) and of their sons”.
Furthermore, participation in voting for elections to various councils was no
longer exempted31. This decision caught the attention of the chronicler Giorgio
Dolfin who noted that the bills were passed, “in order that the members of the
Ten and zonta might not suffer any injury to their honor by the relatives of the
condemned”32. 
At the back of the register of the Ten’s deliberations for these years are
partial lists of the men disqualified to judge the various members of the Ten on
account of these cases of electoral fraud as well as those disqualified because
of their kinship with Jacopo and the doge. For example, those excluded by
reason of kinship with Donato Corner included Corner himself, his sons
Andrea, Domenico, and Ludovico, his brother Pietro and his brothers-in-law
Bartolomeo Zorzi, Domenico Morosini, as well as Ludovico, Hieronimo, and
Paolo Dolfin. In Jacopo’s case, the list included not only Jacopo and the doge
but also the doge’s brother Marco as well as their cousins Filippo, Urbano,
Ludovico, and Giovanni Foscari. Various other men related to the Foscari
through marriage were also inscribed. These included not only Andrea Donato
and Marco Ruzzini, specifically described as Jacopo’s brothers-in-law, but also
Andrea and Francesco Venier, Nicolo Mudazzo, and Pietro Bernardo – all
related by marriage to the doge and Jacopo. It included as well Jacopo’s father-
in-law Leonardo Contarini along with his sons and sons-in-law33. These two
examples perfectly illustrate the ripple effect that these legal sanctions entailed.
In the Corner case, for instance, not only did the penalty include other Corner,
but also members of some of Venice’s largest and most distinguished noble
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31 Summaries of these cases are found in Queller, 89-90, 98-100 (with some inaccuracies), and
Romano, 2007, 272-75. The acts forbidding judicial retaliation and the lists of men protected by
it are found in ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fols. 128r-v, 131v, 133r (acts dated 3, 20, and 30 June 1457). 
32 Dolfin, fol. 447v.
33 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fols. 202v-203r (undated). See also Romano, 2007, 318.
families such as the Morosini. Moreover men from families who were related
by marriage to the Zorzi, Morosini, and Dolfin families but not to the Corner
now felt the sting since their in-laws had been singled out and legally excluded
from full participation in the governance of the state. This devalued the
currency of these marital alliances and threatened dishonor since members of
these families had been officially inscribed in the public records as potential
subverters of justice in pursuit of vengeance.
The Ten’s decision created another problem as well. Given the large
number of men involved in the electoral fraud cases and the breadth of the
circles of kinsmen surrounding them, the government faced potential paralysis.
The number of men declared ineligible by reason of consanguinity was large
enough that the Ten realized that the government might have difficulty
reaching the necessary quorums to conduct elections, the lifeblood of Venice’s
republican regime. Suddenly the problem of relying on kinship as the criterion
for ineligibility became clear, especially for a ruling class as closed and inbred
as Venice’s. And so, the Ten modified the prohibition, declaring that if a
quorum could not be reached on account of the exclusions, then the
deficiencies should be made up by selecting additional members by lottery,
first from the ranks of the three state attorneys, then from the three heads of
the Ten, and finally, if necessary, from the three auditori vecchi, officials
charged with the appeal of civil cases34.
In the midst of this turmoil, Foscari continued to neglect his
responsibilities. Finally, in mid-October 1457 the Ten became concerned
enough that it took up the matter, but only after first excluding from its
meetings men related to the doge and adding a twenty-five member zonta. At
the time, Jacopo Loredan was again serving as one of the heads of the council.
Suffice it to say that on 22 October the Ten voted to remove Foscari from the
dogeship on account of his incapacity35. Foscari resisted, arguing that only the
body that had elected him, namely the Great Council, could remove him36. In
the debate that followed within the Ten over this constitutional question, it
was Loredan who argued that it fell within the Ten’s competency while the
other two heads wished to refer it to the Great Council. Loredan’s position
narrowly prevailed on a fourth ballot37. Having made their decision to depose
the doge, the Ten then unanimously passed three measures designed to protect
themselves and their reputations. First, they forbade members from lobbying
to be elected the next doge. Second, they imposed a strict gag order on their
proceedings. Third, they voted to protect themselves, their sons, brothers, and
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34 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 132r (21 June 1457). Romano, 2007, 275.
35 I treat the deposition fully in Romano, 2007, 292-310. 
36 Dolfin, fol. 448v.
37 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 140r (22 October 1457); Berlan, 188. This is an instance where Berlan’s
edited version is misleading since it does not indicate that Girolamo Donato and Girolamo
Barbarigo proposed that the matter be referred to the Great Council, whereas Loredan proposed
that it be considered by the Ten. See Romano, 2007, 299, 303-04.
grandsons from legal reprisal by the doge or his relatives, whom they once
again defined as those who had to excuse themselves from elections on account
of propinquity38.
The deposition of doge Foscari was one of the most momentous events in
the history of the Venetian Republic39. Its immediate effects were twofold. First
and not surprisingly, it sharply divided members of the patriciate into pro-
and anti-Foscari camps. The bad feelings were exacerbated when Foscari died
just a week after being forced from office. The second effect of the deposition
was to create a backlash against the Ten, especially among rank and file
members of the Great Council who believed that it had overstepped its bounds. 
As their deliberations of 26 November 1457 indicate, members of the Ten
feared retaliation. And two legal questions had arisen as a consequence of their
earlier decisions. The first concerned whether the prohibition on Foscari’s
relatives using the courts to seek vengeance excluded them from collecting
debts that they were owed by members of the Ten and its zonta; the second
whether they could fulfill their responsibility as executors of estates if those
estates had claims against members of the Ten and the zonta. In both instances
the Ten put commercial and economic interests first, by voting that the Foscari
relatives could seek payment for what was owed them and could fulfill their
fiduciary responsibilities. But the Signoria, the government’s highest executive
body, overruled the Ten on a technicality, determining that both measures had
failed to pass since they had not gotten the unanimous vote required by the
original legislation of 22 October40.
Nevertheless retribution of a sort came the following autumn through a
series of reforms within the Council of Ten itself. A year to the day after
Foscari’s deposition, the heads of the Ten proposed that a zonta of twenty
noblemen be convened to consider a range of questions regarding the power
of the heads of the Ten, the Ten’s growing jurisdiction, especially in matters
that were customarily the competence of the Great Council, as well as
concerning the penalties meted out by the Ten. It took three rounds of voting
for this enabling legislation to pass. Pressure from the Foscari partisans
combined with discontent among both the poorer nobles and the popolo seems
to have forced the Ten to act41. 
Two days later, on 25 October 1458, the Ten and its zonta passed three
measures addressing these concerns. The first contained a prologue observing
that recently the Council of Ten had concerned itself with matters regarding the
ducal promissione or oath of office (they were referring to the constitutional
question regarding who had the power to depose the doge) and that it might do
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38 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 140v (acts dated 22 October 1457); Berlan, 189-91; Romano, 2007, 299-
300.
39 For ways in which Foscari’s story has resonated through the centuries, see Romano, 2007, 332-68.
40 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fols. 141v-142r (acts dated 26 November 1457); Berlan, 192-94; Romano,
2007, 318-19. 
41 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 163r (23 October 1458); Berlan, 194-95.
so again in the future, causing, “great scandal and danger to our State”. The Ten
decided that henceforth, “for the peacefulness and evident good of our State”, they
should not concern themselves with the ducal promissione or its contents. The
only exception involved conspiracies, the traditional responsibility of the council42.
The second measure noted that over the past twelve or thirteen years the
heads of the Ten had expanded their jurisdiction by issuing decisions,
commissions, and letters without authorization from the entire council.
Observing first that not even the ducal councilors could issue such rulings
unless three of them were in agreement on the matter, second that the heads
of the Ten had even less authority to do so than did the ducal councilors, and
third that the dignity of the Signoria was being diminished by petitioners
clamoring to have audiences with the heads of the Ten, the Ten and zonta
voted that henceforth the heads could not issue such papers and rulings
without authorization from the council and then only in matters that were
under the Ten’s purview43. Clearly, noble sentiment backed by popular opinion
blamed the Ten and especially its heads for what had happened to Jacopo and
his father44. It is likely that they blamed Jacopo Loredan in particular. The
backdrop to these reforms was the conviction that the Foscari had been the
victims of a vendetta by their enemies. 
But the third measure is the most significant of the three for it was clearly
designed to tamp down those same flames of factional conflict within the
patriciate. Observing that it was essential, “by all possible means”, to maintain
“our united and peaceful State in its united and peaceful regimen”, and to obviate
even the smallest “division or scandal” which could bring “ruin and desolation”,
and noting that in the past ten years the Ten had begun to issue penalties that
deprived kinsmen of their right to sit as judges in cases, something that it had not
done in the previous ninety-five years even for crimes deserving death, the Ten
voted thirty-four to two that henceforth they could not issue sentences depriving
“offspring or relatives” (progenies vel propinqui) of the condemned either of
offices or their judicial rights. In approving this measure the Ten noted that it was
not proper to deny members of the nobility those privileges which their “noble
origins and liberty and the laws of the city of Venice” conveyed, nor was it right
for anyone to bear the blame for something that was not his own fault. Two
exceptions remained: one involved treason, in which case the Ten could act as it
saw fit; the other included cases in which the Ten judged the character of the
condemned and “of their sons”, to be of sufficient danger that they could be
deprived of these rights. But even in those instances the penalties were to extend
only to fathers and sons and no further45.
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42 The original phrases read, “cum maximo scandalo et periculo Status nostri” and “pro quieto et evidenti
bono Status nostri”. ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 163r (acts dated 25 October 1458); Berlan, 195-96.
43 ASVe, DM, reg. 15, fol. 163v (26 October 1458); Berlan, 196-98. Berlan’s transcription incorrectly
gives the date as 15 October.
44 Maranini (2:418) also attributes the reforms to growing fear of the power of the Ten.
45 The original phrases read, “Quum omnibus modis possibilibus quaerendum est conservandi hunc
By this action, the Council of Ten stepped away from a dangerous practice.
Starting with the 1433 electoral corruption case, they had tried to protect
themselves, the most powerful members of Venetian society against retaliation
by prohibiting those against whom they had acted and their kinsmen from
exercising some of the traditional prerogatives of noble status. In so doing, they
transformed kinship which was the foundation of political participation in
Venice into a potential liability since now noblemen could be deprived of some
of their rights simply on the basis of being related by blood or marriage to
someone convicted of a crime. This had the potential to disrupt political practice
as it had developed since the Serrata and undermine Venice’s consensual regime
since what had heretofore been the key to political success, the assembling of a
large and extensive network of relatives and friends who could provide support
in elections, now became a potential source of disenfranchisement.
The problems with this tool became clear when the Ten applied it broadly
in the 1457 electoral corruption cases. Given the interlocking ties within the
nobility, it threatened to immobilize the government as quorums could not be
met. It also forced the Ten to balance economic rights against political ones as
when they were forced to rule whether or not the Foscari and their relatives
could pursue debts owed to them and to estates for which they were the
fiduciaries. As befit one of Europe’s most precocious capitalist regimes, they
opted to protect economic interests, although their decision was overturned by
the Signoria on a technicality. An even more serious problem developed,
however, when the concept of judicial vendetta was applied in the cases
involving Jacopo for it got entangled in the rivalry between the Foscari and the
Loredan. The codification of judicial vendetta as a weapon and the inscription
of the names both of those likely to pursue vendetta and those likely to suffer
from it went a long way toward creating two parties defined by their pro- or
anti-Foscari stance46. But in the end, the members of the Ten recognized the
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nostrum unitum et pacificum Statum in suo unito et quieto regimine, et obviandum omnibus principiis
quae aliquam et minimam divisionem aut scandalum possint producere”, and “illud donum quod sua
originaria nobilitas et libertas, et leges civitatis Venetiarum sibi naturaliter contulerunt”. ASVe, DM,
reg. 15, fol. 163v (25 October 1457); Berlan, 198-99; Romano, 2007, 319-20. Even with these reforms,
the issues raised by the power of the Ten did not go away. Ten years later, in September 1468, the Great
Council intervened by reiterating the traditional competencies of the Ten, but otherwise prohibiting
the Ten from expanding its jurisdiction, and especially warning the Heads to observe those limits. ASVe,
Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni, reg. 23 (Regina), fols. 82v-83r (18 September 1468). The law is
partially transcribed in Maranini, 2:419n1. 
46 There is a powerful tradition in Venetian historiography which sees the struggles between the Senate
and Council of Ten in particular against the Great Council and the Council of Forty as indicative of a
major economic and social division between the richest and most powerful members of the patriciate
(the primi de la terra) and the less powerful and poorer members. My own sense is that these contests
had more to do with bureaucratic and constitutional jockeying for power and position than with any
clearly defined class struggle, especially given that individual patricians often moved during the course
of their careers from the lower councils to the higher ones. Furthermore, as this example shows, these
contests were often entangled in familial and personal animosities. For classic statements of the division,
see Cozzi, 293-345; Finlay, 59-81.
limits of kinship, determining that kinsmen should not be politically
responsible, at least not legally so, for the actions of their relations. They
returned to first principles and neutralized this potential source of division,
opting instead to reaffirm the essential equality of members of the patriciate47.
5. In addition to illustrating the particular dynamics of mid-fifteenth-century
Venetian politics, this examination of kinship and vendetta illuminates two
broader issues. First, it adds to the growing body of historical literature
demonstrating that kinship ties were not always an unmitigated benefit. It
demonstrates that there could be negative components to kinship relations even
in the city-states of Renaissance Italy where family counted for so much. In this
way, it encourages historians to be on the lookout for other ways in which
historical actors were forced to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
family relations and kinship ties48. Second, it cautions us to think carefully about
the complex and highly variegated ways in which factions and governmental
structures interrelated. In some places, including fifteenth-century Florence,
factionalism arose for the most part independently of the state. The key to the
success of the Medici family was their bank which allowed them to create an
extensive network of kinsmen, friends, and neighbors49. Eventually, the Medici
faction was able to take control of the Florentine government and turn it to its
own purposes. In Venice, by contrast, the state played a crucial role in the
development (or the potential development) of factionalism. As we have seen,
the Council of Ten in its effort to protect its members against retribution helped
reify and institutionalize the notion of vendetta and facilitated the development
of factional identities by creating lists of those likely to pursue vendetta and
those likely to be victims of it50. In the end, however, the conviction that kinship
conveyed privileges proved stronger and led the Ten to reverse course and in so
doing disarm one potential for factionalism in fifteenth-century Venice.
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47 See Romano, 2009.
48 The literature on the role of the family in Renaissance Italy is now vast. Much of it recognizes
the largely positive role of kinship ties in fostering the political, economic, and social goals of
family members. There is a much smaller literature on the downside of kinship ties. See, among
others, King, Kuehn, 1981; Kuehn, 1982; Kuehn 1991; Kuehn, 1992; Gamberini, 2001. For Venice,
see some very brief remarks on “the political liabilities stemming from their [patricians’] clan
identification” in Finlay, 85; see also Maranini, 2:114.
49 Molho. 
50 There is a debate regarding the precise relationship between factions and the state, especially as
it pertained to laws governing vendetta and feud. One side argues for a progressivist model,
according to which what are often described as primitive vendetta-pursuing groups yield to more
modern rationalizing bureaucracies of the state. For this view, see, among others, Muir, xxiii, 247-
82; Enriques; Maugain, 32, 238; Heers, 119-24; Larner, 109-45; Starn, 96-101. The other side
challenges this view as too teleological and sees both vendetta and the law as processes of communal
conflict resolution. See Zorzi, esp. 137, 158; Kuehn, 1991, 78-83. See also Raggio; and Gamberini.
For more on these debates, see Smail, 1996; Kaminsky, 2002; Carroll, 2003; Smail, 2012.
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Abstract
Historians have long recognized the important role that kinship ties and family relations played in
Venetian politics, especially their salutary effect in forging a cohesive ruling class. The essay considers
the practice – increasingly utilized in the middle decades of the fifteenth century – of disqualifying
kinsmen from exercising some of their judicial rights out of concern that they would use those rights
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to seek vengeance against those who they believed had done them wrong. The danger of disqualification
became clear when the Council of Ten made use of it in the scandals surrounding doge Francesco
Foscari and his son Jacopo. In the end, the Ten pulled back and decided to limit the power to disqualify
noblemen from their full prerogatives. This essay thus examines a moment when kinship ties became
a liability in Venetian politics as well as the role governmental practices played in fostering rather than
suppressing factionalism.
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